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Platform providers are often both competitors and complementors. On the one hand,
they compete for the same clientele when they try to attract customers. On the other
hand, they are complementors to the extent that a quality enhancing investment by
one platform sponsor benefits customers connected to the rivals’ platform. When
a bank increases the functionality or the size of its ATM-network, this will usually
benefit the rivals’ customers if they have at least imperfect access to the other bank’s
ATMs. An Internet backbone provider that improves its platform functionality
will also increase the quality of its rivals’ backbones due to peering agreements
(interconnection) between the backbone providers. If an airline company improves
its network, the rivals’ customers also benefit to the extent that the firms have
interlining agreements. Analogously, mobile phone operators share their networks
through roaming agreements.
We show that potential entry of independent firms may solve the quality under-
investment problem that typically arises between compatible platforms, and thus
increase their profitability. In our model the platform sponsors may open up the
basic platform to independent rivals and make higher profits, but the rivals will
choose not to enter.
The present paper is related to Katz and Shapiro (1985) and the strand of lit-
erature that analyzes strategic choices of compatibility. A recent, comprehensive
account of this literature is given by Farrell and Klemperer (2004) and Church and
Gandal (2004). The literature on strategic R&D investments and spillovers, where
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) is the seminal work, resembles the model struc-
ture analyzed in the present paper. However, none of this literature considers the
interplay between the choice of compatibility and investments. In this respect our
paper is most closely related to Ceccagnoli (2005), but contrary to his paper our
work analyses endogenous determination of spillovers.
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2 The model
We consider a context with two possibly incompatible platforms, A and B. The
inverse demand curve facing platform sponsor i = A,B in the end-user market is
given by
pi = ai −Q, (1)
where Q is total output in the market. Each platform sponsor may invest in order
to improve the quality of the good it offers, leading to a positive shift in the demand
curve. To capture this, let
ai = a+ (xi + βsxj) , (2)
where a > 0 is a positive constant, and xi, xj ≥ 0 are indexes of the quality improve-
ments undertaken by the two firms (i 6= j). The variable βs ∈ [0, 1] measures the
degree of reciprocal compatibility between the sponsors’ platforms. The platforms
are completely incompatible if βs = 0, while there is perfect compatibility if βs = 1.
Compatibility refers throughout to the extent to which one firm can take advantage
of the rival’s quality improvement.
The profit for platform sponsor i equals:
πi = piqi − φx2i /2, (3)
where φ > 0 and sufficiently large to ensure a stable equilibrium.
In addition to the platform sponsors there are n identical potential entrants
with access to at least the basic platform quality. The inverse demand curve facing
entrant e = 1, ..n is
pe = ae −Q,
where
ae = a+ βe (xA + xB) . (4)
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The variable βe ∈ [0, 1] indicates the level of compatibility that the sponsors offer to
the entrants. If βe = 0 the entrants only have access to the basic platform quality,
while they benefit from all the quality improvements made by the sponsors if βe = 1.
With two platform sponsors and n entrants, total quantity equals




The main purpose of this paper is to show that the existence of potential entrants
may have a positive influence on the sponsors’ profit. In order to bias the model
against this result, we assume that the sponsors are unable to charge any access fee
from the potential entrants. Let the profit for firm e equal:
πe = peqe. (5)
We consider a three-stage game where sponsors determine investment levels non-
cooperatively at stage 1, set compatibility levels at stage 2, and platform sponsors
and entrants compete in quantities at stage 3.
2.1 A benchmark: A duopoly of platform sponsors
We consider the outcome if the two platform sponsors deny any entrants access to
the platforms. The Cournot game between the platform sponsors at the final stage
of the game implies that qi = (2ai − aj) /3. At stage 2 the platform sponsors set the
level of compatibility, and, using equation (3), we find ∂πi/∂βs = 2pi∂qi/∂βs,where
∂qi/∂βs = (2xj − xi) /3.
Assume that there exists a stable and symmetric equilibrium (which in Appendix
A1 is shown to require that φ > 4/9), so that xi = xj.1 We then see that ∂qi/∂βs > 0;
improved compatibility increases the perceived quality of the goods, and therefore




1The second-order condition is satisfied if φ > 2/9. If 2/9 < φ < 4/9 there will exist a stable
equilibrium where only one of the platforms is operative. We do not focus on this equilibrium.
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implying that the firms will set βs = 1; the platform sponsors will choose maximum
compatibility. By doing this they will maximize the size of the market for any given
investment level.
At stage 1 the platform sponsors simultaneously choose investment levels. In-
serting βs = 1 and solving ∂π1/∂x1 = ∂π2/∂x2 = 0 yield an investment level (with




2.2 A platform sponsor duopoly with entrants
We now allow for free entry of non-platform firms. We maintain the same timing
structure as above. Solving ∂πi/∂qi = ∂πe/∂qe = 0 (i = A,B, e = 1, ..., n) it follows
that the equilibrium quantities at stage 3 are given by:
qi =
ai (n+ 2)− aj − aen
n+ 3
and qe =
3ae − aA − aB
n+ 3
. (7)
Prior to the Cournot game, but after investments are sunk, the sponsors decide
on the level of βe and βs. The operating profit for firm i is then given by πi = piqi,













It follows that the platform sponsors will set βs = 1 and βe = 0; the latter ensures
the platform sponsors a competitive advantage over the entrants.
At stage 1 each sponsor maximizes profit with respect to its investment level,











A marginal increase in investments allows the sponsor to charge a higher price and
sell a larger output. The value of this for the firm is captured by the first two terms
in (8), while the third term measures marginal investment costs.
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Solving ∂π1/∂x1 = ∂π2/∂x2 = 0 we find
xi =
2 (n+ 1)
φ (n+ 3)2 − 4 (n+ 1)2
a (9)
We restrict attention to considering a stable symmetric equilibrium, in which case
the denominator in (9) is positive (see Appendix A2).
From equation (9) we immediately see that ∂xi/∂φ < 0, so that higher marginal
investment costs reduce the investment level. Lower investments in turn imply that
the sponsors gain a smaller competitive advantage over the potential rivals. Inserting
for (9) into (7) we thus find that ∂qi/∂φ < 0 and ∂qe/∂φ > 0.The relationship
between xi, qi, qe and n is ambiguous. To see why, it is useful to analyze how the
investment incentives depend on the number of entrants. Differentiating (8) with

















The terms in the bracket of equation (10) identify how an increase in the number
of entrants affects the platform owner’s marginal revenue on investments. First, by
investing in quality improvement, the sponsor gains a competitive advantage over
the entrants and captures a larger share of the market. This business stealing effect
is stronger the larger is n, and indicates that, for any given price, the incentives to
invest in quality improvement are increasing in the number of entrants. Formally,








A larger number of entrants also means that the price falls. This price effect has a





= − n+ 1
(n+ 3)2
qe < 0. (12)
An increase in n thus has two opposing effects on the investment incentives for
sponsor i; the business stealing effect raises the incentives, while the opposite is
true for the price effect. If n is small, the price pi is relatively high. Therefore the
6
value of the business stealing effect is high, and we may expect the sum of (11) and
(12) to be positive. This does not mean that entry necessarily increases profit (see
Appendix A3):
Proposition 1: For any φ < ∞, the platform sponsors invest more with some
potential entry than when entry is denied, but the platform sponsors’ profit levels are
strictly decreasing in n if φ > 4.
In Appendix A4 we prove the main result of the paper:
Proposition 2: Assume that:
a. φ ≤ 3/4. The platform sponsors make the same profit whether there is open
access or not, since a potential entrant would face no demand.
b. 3/4 < φ < φ∗ ≡ 2 + 2
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√
57 ≈ 3.68. The platform sponsors make higher
profits by opening up their networks than by denying independent firms entry, and
will invest sufficiently to foreclose the potential entrants from the market.
To see the intuition for Proposition 2, assume that the platform sponsors cooper-
ate to maximize their aggregate profit at the investment stage (while still competing
in the end-user market). In this case the free-rider problem between the platform
sponsors would vanish and investments increase.2 Put differently, with cooperation
the sponsors would take into account the fact that higher investments by one firm
increase the size of the market for both firms. In this respect they would internalize
the positive spillover effects of investments.
The sponsors will consequently invest too little in a non-cooperative game. How-
ever, if 3/4 < φ < φ∗ the business stealing effect identified in equation (11) implies
that each of the sponsors will have stronger incentives to invest and increase their
profit when the entrants have access to the basic platform than when such access is
denied. Thus, in this case the threat of entry is beneficial for the platform sponsors,
but no entry will actually take place. This explains Proposition 2.3
2Proof is available on request from the authors.
3The platform sponsors would consequently prefer to deny entry if φ > φ∗, but allow entry in
order to reduce the free-rider problem at the investment stage if φ < φ∗. However, it should be
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3 Concluding remarks
In the present model the compatibility choice is made after investments are sunk,
but we may also imagine that the compatibility choice is made first. Usually there
will be divergence in the platform sponsors’ incentives to be compatible ex ante
and ex post of the investment that enhances the quality of the platform. It is
straightforward to show that this divergence is reduced, and possibly eliminated,
if the platform sponsors open up their basic platforms for entrants. The reason is
that high compatibility increases the competitive advantage over potential rivals.




Solving ∂πi/∂xi = 0 gives rise to the reaction function xi(xj) = 2(a+ xj)/(9φ− 2).
The system is stable if x0i(xj) < 1, which holds if φ > 4/9. Q.E.D.
Assuming φ > 4/9, and solving ∂π1/∂qx1 = ∂π2/∂x2 = 0, yield xdi as given by










noted that for any φ <∞, potential as well as actual entry means that the platform sponsors have
a common interest in gaining a competitive advantage over the non-platform owners.
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4.2 Appendix A2
With free entry of non-platform firms, the equilibrium quantities in the final stage
are given by equation (7). Inserting for this into the profit functions, we find that
∂2πi
∂x2i
= −φ (n+ 3)
2 − 2 (n+ 1)2
(n+ 3)2
.








stability condition x0i(xj) < 1 consequently holds if




This verifies that the denominator in equation (9) is positive in a stable equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
4.3 Appendix A3
Let us first prove that the investment incentives increase if there is some potential
entry. Using equations (6) and (9) we find that the difference between sponsor
investments with denied entry and entry accommodation equals
xi − xdi = 2an
(3− n)φ+ 4 (1 + n)
(φ− φ1) (9φ− 4) (n+ 3)2
. (16)
A sufficient condition for equation (16) to be positive, is that n < 3φ+4
φ−4 . From (16)
we immediately see that this always holds for n ≤ 3.
Let us now prove that profit is strictly decreasing in n is φ > 4. We insert for
(9) into (7) to find that equilibrium quantities equal
qi =
aφ
(φ− φ1) (n+ 3)
and qe =
(φ− φ2) a
(φ− φ1) (n+ 3)
, (17)
where φ2 ≡ 4(n+ 1)/(n+ 3). Note that a potential entrant will face a non-positive
demand if φ < 4/3 (since we then have φ− φ2 < 0).
Inserting for (9) and (17) into (3) we further have
πi =
φ− φSOC
(φ− φ1)2 (n+ 3)2
φa2. (18)
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(φ3 − φ) (φ− φ4)
(φ− φ1)3 (n+ 3)3
,



















forward algebra shows that φ1−φ4 > 0. In a stable equilibrium, it thus follows that
sign (∂π1/∂n) = sign(φ3 − φ). Since ∂φ3/∂n > 0 with limn→∞ φ3 = 4, it follows
that ∂πi/∂n < 0 if φ > 4. Q.E.D.
4.4 Appendix A4
Solving φ− φ2 = 0, we find that qe = 0 if n = max {0, n∗} , where n∗ ≡ 3φ−44−φ (n = 0





a2 > πdi for 4/3 < φ < φ




This proves Proposition 2.
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